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Abstract
Generating adversarial examples in a black-box setting
retains a significant challenge with vast practical applica-
tion prospects. In particular, existing black-box attacks suf-
fer from the need for excessive queries, as it is non-trivial
to find an appropriate direction to optimize in the high-
dimensional space. In this paper, we propose Projection &
Probability-driven Black-box Attack (PPBA) to tackle this
problem by reducing the solution space and providing bet-
ter optimization. For reducing the solution space, we first
model the adversarial perturbation optimization problem
as a process of recovering frequency-sparse perturbations
with compressed sensing, under the setting that random
noise in the low-frequency space is more likely to be ad-
versarial. We then propose a simple method to construct
a low-frequency constrained sensing matrix, which works
as a plug-and-play projection matrix to reduce the dimen-
sionality. Such a sensing matrix is shown to be flexible
enough to be integrated into existing methods like NES and
BanditsTD. For better optimization, we perform a random
walk with a probability-driven strategy, which utilizes all
queries over the whole progress to make full use of the sens-
ing matrix for a less query budget. Extensive experiments
show that our method requires at most 24% fewer queries
with a higher attack success rate compared with state-of-
the-art approaches. Finally, the attack method is evaluated
on the real-world online service, i.e., Google Cloud Vision
API, which further demonstrates our practical potentials. 1
1. Introduction
While deep neural networks (DNNs) have proven their
dominant performance on a wide range of computer vision
∗Corresponding author.
1The code for reproducing our work is available at https://
github.com/theFool32/PPBA
tasks, they are shown to be vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples [24, 38, 40]. In such a scenario, the imperceptible
perturbations added to input samples can mislead the output
of DNNs, which has raised serious security concerns in the
literature [7, 15, 33].
Adversarial attacks can be generally categorized into the
white-box attack and black-box attack. In white-box attacks,
the adversary has the full knowledge of the victim model in-
cluding network architecture and parameters, and can effi-
ciently achieve an almost 100% attack success rate within a
few iterations guided by the gradient descent [8, 16, 29, 31].
However, white-box attacks are less practical for commer-
cial systems like Google Cloud Vision API, where the
model is inaccessible.
To this end, the black-box attacks, including transfer-
based attacks and query-based attacks, are more practi-
cal where the adversary is only able to craft model in-
puts and obtain corresponding outputs. Transfer-based at-
tacks [13, 25, 32] adopt the adversarial perturbation crafted
from a surrogate white-box model and transfer it to the
black-box victim model. They require less time consump-
tion, but suffer from low attack performance, since the tar-
get model may be very different from the surrogate. To
achieve a high attack success rate, recent works [9, 10]
queried iteratively to estimate the gradients and then per-
form the white-box attacks, or approach the decision bound-
ary first and then wander along it. Due to the high-
dimensional input space, it is hard to find a feasible direc-
tion to optimize, which results in numerous queries and a
high cost of time and money. Some extra efforts have been
put on reducing the dimension of solution space, like uti-
lizing latent variable space of autoencoder [39] or adopting
low-resolution images [21]. Essentially, these methods re-
duce the solution space from the perspective of the spatial
domain, and the reduction of dimension is limited since im-
ages with quite low-resolution will be unserviceable, which
makes these methods still inefficient.
In this paper, we propose Projection & Probability-
driven Black-box Attack (PPBA) towards achieving a high
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attack success rate with few queries. Optimization in a
high dimension is difficult and urges for a smaller so-
lution space [11, 28]. On the other hand, some recent
works [17, 34] have experimentally verified that adversarial
perturbations tend to lie in the low-frequency space, which
is a subspace of the original solution space. These both
motivate us to form a smaller search space from the fre-
quency perspective. Considering that, we first reduce the
query number via reducing the solution space with a low-
frequency constrained projection matrix. In particular, we
view this problem as recovering adversarial perturbations
using compressed sensing with a sensing matrix. This sens-
ing matrix can be crafted by applying the inverse Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) [1] on the standard basis and se-
lecting the low-frequency parts. The sensing matrix is plug-
and-play as a projection matrix. With the elaborate sensing
matrix, we reduce the dimension of the solution space from
that of the image space (e.g., 224× 224× 3 = 150, 528) to
a very small one (e.g., 1, 500). Based on this sensing ma-
trix, we then propose a more suitable attack strategy driven
by probability. We care merely about the direction of each
dimension, upon which we quantize the value of every it-
eration into a triplet. Then, a probability-driven strategy is
kicked in to take advantage of information throughout the
iteration process to perform a random walk optimization.
Extensive experiments show the efficiency of the pro-
posed PPBA method. By integrating the proposed low-
frequency sensing matrix into various existing methods, we
verify that it is flexible enough, which can reduce 9.6%
queries with a higher attack success rate for VGG-16 [35]
on ImageNet [12]. PPBA further improves the performance
over the state-of-the-art methods [18, 20, 21] with at least
11% fewer queries for Inception v3 [37] on ImageNet. Fi-
nally, we evaluate PPBA on the real-world image classifier,
i.e., Google Cloud Vision API, and show that our method
can efficiently corrupt it with an 84% success rate.
Concretely, the contributions of this work are as follows:
• We view generating adversarial perturbations as recov-
ering sparse signals and propose a low-frequency sens-
ing matrix to efficiently reduce the dimension of the
solution space. The sensing matrix is plug-and-play
and can be integrated into existing methods functioned
as a projection matrix.
• Based on this projection matrix, a probability-driven
attack method is proposed, which suits the sensing ma-
trix more and makes the best use of the information
throughout the whole iteration process.
• The proposed PPBA method achieves higher perfor-
mance on different neural networks [19, 35, 37] pre-
trained on ImageNet [12], compared with state-of-the-
art methods [18, 20, 21], and can fool real-world sys-
tems efficiently.
2. Related Work
2.1. White-Box Attacks
The adversary under the white-box settings has full
knowledge of the victim model. Szegedy et al. [38] first
demonstrated that intentionally perturbated images, e.g. by
adding quasi-imperceptible adversarial perturbations, can
fool neural networks. These adversarial perturbations can
be crafted with box-constrained L-BFGS [26]. Subse-
quently, various methods have been proposed to generate
such perturbations. For example, Goodfellow et al. [16, 23]
took a linear view of adversarial examples and proposed fast
ways of generating them in one step or iteratively. Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [31] attempted to find adversarial examples
from the decision boundary. Carlini et al. [8] compared dif-
ferent objective functions and proposed a powerful C&W
attack method. Note that these methods perform optimiza-
tion with the gradient information, which cannot be applied
to black-box attacks directly.
2.2. Black-Box Attacks
White-box attacks are unrealistic for many real-world
systems, where neither model architectures nor parameters
are available. Under this scenario, black-box attacks are
necessary. In black-box attacks, the adversary is unable to
access the target victim model, and only the model inputs
and its corresponding outputs can be fetched. In this paper,
we assume that the outputs include prediction confidences
since it is a common setting for popular online systems, e.g.,
Google Cloud Vision, Clarifai, and Microsoft Custom Vi-
sion. There are two types of black-box attack methods, i.e.,
transfer-based attacks and query-based attacks:
Transfer-Based Attacks. Since models trained on the
same dataset may share similar decision boundaries, adver-
sarial examples can transfer across models to some degree.
Considering that, the adversary performs a standard white-
box attack on accessible local models to construct adver-
sarial examples, which are expected to be transferred to the
inaccessible target model. One type of such attack assumes
that the local model and target model are trained with data
from similar distributions, and no query on the target model
is needed [27, 30, 38]. Another type of such attack is to dis-
till the target model with a surrogate model [25, 32], which
requests a large number of queries to train the local model
and is thus inefficient. Although there exist many works fo-
cusing on improving the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples [13, 41, 42], the attack success rates of transfer-based
attacks are still less competitive to query-based attacks.
Query-Based Attacks. Query-based attacks define an
objective function and update the perturbation iteratively
to optimize this function. Each iteration requires one or
more queries to determine the next step. Authors in [13, 36]
constructed the adversarial perturbations with an evolution-
ary algorithm. The efficiency of evolutionary algorithms is
highly dependent on the dimension of the inputs and the size
of the solution space, which makes these algorithms time-
consuming. The authors in [3, 9] proposed the decision-
based attack that initiates perturbations from a target image
or with a large norm to guarantee adversarial and then re-
duces the norm iteratively along the decision boundary. De-
spite a high success rate, this kind of method requires a large
number of queries wandering along the decision boundary
as the boundary can be potentially complex. Another main-
stream of query-based attacks is to estimate the gradients
and then perform the white-box attack. Chen et al. [10]
proposed the ZOO (zeroth-order optimization) attack that
adopts the finite-difference method with dimension-wise es-
timation to approximate the gradient values. It takes 2d
queries in each iteration, where d is the dimension of the
input image (d can be more than 150, 000). Bhagoji et
al. [2] attempted to reduce the query budget in each iteration
via random grouping or PCA components mapping. Tu et
al. [39] utilized a pretrained autoencoder and optimized the
perturbations in the latent space. Instead of using the finite-
difference method, Ilyas et al. [20] proposed the NES attack
that adopts the natural evolution strategy to estimate gradi-
ents with random vectors. The BanditsTD is further pro-
posed in [21], which incorporates time and data-dependent
information with the bandit theory to reduce the query cost.
Guo et al. [18] proposed the SimBA-DCT that adds or sub-
tracts random vectors iteratively from a set of orthonormal
vectors to craft adversarial examples. Considerable query
cost is reduced by the aforementioned methods, which is
however still far from satisfactory.
3. The Proposed Method
The large solution space for black-box and the ineffi-
cient optimization retain as two key bottlenecks for existing
black-box attack methods. To solve these two issues, we
first reduce the solution space from its original dimension
with a low-frequency constrained sensing matrix, as de-
tailed in Sec. 3.2. Then, to further reduce the query cost, we
propose a novel weighted random walk optimization based
on the sensing matrix, as described in Sec. 3.3.
3.1. Preliminaries
Given a deep neural network classifier f : [0, 1]d →
RK that maps the input image x of d dimensions into
the confidence scores of K classes, we define F (x) =
arg maxk f(x)k as the function that outputs the predicted
class. The goal of adversarial attack against classification is
to find a perturbation δ ∈ Rd that satisfies:
F
(
ΠImg(x+ δ)
) 6= F (x), s.t. ‖δ‖p < , (1)
where ΠImg(·) = clip(·, 0, 1)2 is a projection function that
projects the input into the image space, i.e., [0, 1]d, and 
is a hyper-parameter to make the perturbation invisible via
restricting the lp-norm. To achieve the goal, we adopt the
widely used objective function termed C&W loss [8]:
min
‖δ‖p<
L(δ) = [f(x+ δ)t −max
j 6=t
(
f(x+ δ)j)]
+
, (2)
where [·]+ denotes the max(·, 0) function, t is the label of
the clean input. For iterative optimization methods, to guar-
antee the constraint ‖δ‖p < , another projection function
is needed after each update of δ. For instance, for l2-norm,
a projection function Π2(δ, ) = δ ∗min(1, /‖δ‖2) should
be applied in each step.
3.2. Low-Frequency Projection Matrix
3.2.1 Perspective from Compressed Sensing
Recent works have discovered that adversarial perturbations
are biased towards the low frequency information [17, 34].
Suppose there exists an optimal low-frequency perturba-
tion δ∗ that is sparse in the frequency domain for Eq. (1).
Thus, Ψδ∗ should be a sparse vector, where Ψ ∈ Rd×d is
the transform matrix of DCT that maps a vector from the
time/spatial domain to the frequency domain and satisfies
ΨΨT = ΨTΨ = Id×d, where Id×d is the indentify ma-
trix.. According to the compressed sensing theory [5, 14],
we can recover the sparse vector with a measurement matrix
Φ ∈ Rm×d(m  d) and the corresponding measurement
vector z ∈ Rm by:
min ‖Ψδ∗‖2,
s.t. z = Aδ∗ = ΦΨδ∗,
F (x+ δ∗) 6= F (x), (3)
where A = ΦΨ ∈ Rm×d is the sensing matrix.
The measurement matrix Φ can be further simplified as
Φ = [Φm, 0], (Φm ∈ Rm×m, 0 ∈ Rm×(d−m)), to sup-
press high frequency, considering that δ∗ is biased to low
frequency. Note that orthogonal matrices do not change the
norm of a vector after transforming it, which also guaran-
tees the restricted isometry property [4, 6] required by the
compressed sensing theory. Therefore, we directly set Φm
as an orthogonal matrix, and recover the perturbation δ∗
with simple matrix multiplication as:
z = ΦΨδ∗,
ΦT z ≈ Ψδ∗,
ΨTΦT z = AT z ≈ δ∗. (4)
2For simplicity, we will omit it in what follows.
Finally, Eq. (3) can be rewritten as:
min ‖z‖2,
s.t. F (x+AT z) 6= F (x). (5)
As a result, we only need to perform the optimization in
the m-dimensional space instead of the d-dimensional one
(m  d), which results in a smaller solution space and the
higher optimization efficiency.
3.2.2 Perspective from Low Frequency
From another perspective, we discover that the measure-
ment vector z optimized in Eq. (5) has its physical mean-
ing. The optimal perturbation vector δ∗ can be linearly rep-
resented by the discrete cosine basis as below:
δ∗ =
∑
j
αjωj , (6)
where wj is a discrete cosine basis vector, and aj is the cor-
responding coefficient. Note that wj contains the specific
frequency information, we can also view Eq. (6) as decom-
posing δ∗ into the sum of different frequency vectors and
the αj is the corresponding amplitude. Since the vector ωj
can be easily crafted via applying inverse DCT on one of
the standard basis vectors, we then rewrite Eq. (6) into the
form of matrix multiplication as below:
δ∗ = Ωα = ΨTQα, (7)
where Ω is a matrix formed by the frequency vectors ωj as
its columns, ΨT is the transform matrix of inverse DCT as
mentioned before, Q ∈ Rd×m is a submatrix subsampled
from the standard basis Id×d for low frequency, and α is the
amplitude vector.
Comparing Eq. (7) with Eq. (4), it is inspiring to find
that: {
δ∗ = ΨTQα,
δ∗ ≈ ΨTΦT z, ⇒ Ψ
TQα ≈ ΨTΦT z.
SinceQ is orthogonal, it suggests a simple and efficient way
to construct the sensing matrix A by applying inverse DCT
to the standard basis3, and the measurement vector z is just
the amplitude α in Eq. (7).
3.3. Probability-Driven Optimization
As discussed in Sec. 3.2.2, the measurement vector z can
be viewed as the amplitude. Therefore, the change of z
in each iteration can be simplified by a triplet {−ρ, 0, ρ},
denoting decreasing the corresponding amplitude value by
ρ, keeping it, and increasing it by ρ, respectively. Then
3For 2D images, we utilize 2D IDCT, i.e., utilize 1D IDCT twice.
the choice space of the iteration step is further restricted.
Based on this setting, a random walk optimization is further
adopted, which chooses steps randomly and moves when
the step makes the loss descend.
To achieve better performance, instead of adopting the
random steps, we make the best of information in the past
by assuming that the directions of steps in the past are ca-
pable of guiding the choice of the current step to a certain
degree. We rewrite the objective function in Eq. (2) as:
L(z,A) = [f(x+AT z)t −maxj 6=t
(
f(x+AT z)j
)
]
+
, (8)
where an iterative optimization method like random walk
can be applied. In particular, after defining ∆z as the
change of z in an iteration of random walk, a confusion
matrix is calculated for each dimension ∆zj of ∆z as:
−ρ 0 ρ
# effective steps e−ρ e0 eρ
# ineffective steps i−ρ i0 iρ
where e−ρ means the number of times the loss function
(e.g., Eq. (2)) descends when ∆zj = −ρ, and i−ρ means
the number of times the loss function keeps still or ascends
when ∆zj = −ρ. We calculate the effective rate for every
possible value with:
P (effective|∆zj = v) = ev
ev + iv
, for v ∈ {−ρ, 0, ρ}, (9)
and sample ∆zj with a probability as:
P (∆zj = v) =
P (effective|∆zj = v)∑
u P (effective|∆zj = u)
,
for v and u ∈ {−ρ, 0, ρ}. (10)
Therefore, when ∆zj = v, an effective query step increases
the value of ev along with P (effective|∆zj = v), which
results in an increase in P (∆zj = v), and an ineffective
one vice versa.
We prove that with T iterations, the norm of perturbation
δ is bounded by:
‖δ‖2 = ‖AT z‖2 = tr
(
(AT z)TAT z
)
= tr(zTAAT z) = tr(zT z) = ‖z‖2
= ‖
∑
j
∆zj‖2 ≤ ‖T × ~ρ‖2
=
√
m× T × ρ, (11)
where ∆zj is the ∆z of the j-th iteration and ~ρ is a vec-
tor with all elements of value ρ. Despite the above prove,
we still utilize the projection function Π2(·) to keep the
norm constraint. For each iteration, we evaluate whether
Π2(z + ∆z) can successfully decrease the objective func-
tion and update the confusion matrices. We accept the ∆z
Algorithm 1 Projection & Probability-Driven Black-Box
Attack
Input: Input image x, maximum number of queries
max iter.
Output: Perturbation vector δ.
1: Initialize z ← 0 ∈ Rm, confusion matrices with all
elements of 1, and j ← 0
2: Construct sensing matrix A via applying IDCT to the
submatrix of Id×d
3: for j < max iter do
4: Generate ∆z according to Eq. 10
5: if L
(
Π2(z + ∆z), A
)
< L(z,A) for L in Eq. (8)
then
6: z ← Π2(z + ∆z)
7: end if
8: if L(z,A) <= 0 then
9: break.
10: end if
11: Update the confusion matrices accordingly
12: j ← j + 1
13: end for
14: return δ = AT z
and update z = Π2(z + ∆z) only if it succeeds. The
above process repeats until we find an adversarial perturba-
tion or meet the maximum number of iterations. We refer to
this method as Projection & Probability-driven Black-box
Attack (PPBA), and the detailed algorithm is provided in
Alg. 1.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental Setups
Datasets and Victim Models. We evaluate the effec-
tiveness of our proposed PPBA along with baselines on
ImageNet [12]. For each evaluation, we sample 1, 000
images (one image per class) randomly from the valida-
tion set for evaluation. For the victim models, we choose
the widely-used networks pre-trained on ImageNet, i.e.,
ResNet50 [19], VGG-16 [35], and Inception V3 [37]. Con-
sidering the charge cost of Google API ($1.50 for 1, 000
queries), we randomly select 50 images to evaluate the re-
sults on the Google Cloud Vision API4.
Evaluation Metric. Restricting the norm of the result-
ing perturbation, there are two aspects to evaluate black-
box adversarial attacks: How often a feasible solution can
be found, and how efficient the optimization method is.
The attack success rate can quantitatively represent the first
one. We define a successful attack for ImageNet as the one
that changes the top-1 predicted label within the maximum
4https://cloud.google.com/vision/docs/
drag-and-drop
queries. For the second one, the average number of queries
(abbreviated to average queries) can give a rough sense.
We report the average queries on both success samples and
all samples. The average on success samples denotes how
many queries are needed to successfully perturb an input,
which is more useful. However, it is strongly connected to
the success rate and thus gives a false sense for low success
rate attack methods. We thereby report the average on all
samples as a supplement. Considering that samples with a
large number of queries have large impacts on the average
value, we further depict the curve of the success rate versus
the number of queries and calculate the area under the curve
(AUC) for a better comparison.
Compared Methods and Settings. We mainly compare
our proposed PPBA with NES [20], BanditsT [21] (Ban-
dits with the time-dependent prior), BanditsTD [21] (Ban-
dits with the time and data-dependent prior), and SimBA-
DCT [18]. We evaluate the performance of the baselines
with the source code released by the authors5, and use the
default parameters setting in their papers. We also per-
form the random walk with each step uniformly sampled
from the triplet space to test the efficiency of our proposed
probability-driven strategy. We name this kind of attack as
Projection & Random walk Black-box Attack (PRBA). Fol-
lowing the settings in [21], we set the maximum l2-norm
for perturbations to 5, and the maximum l∞-norm to 0.05.
Since 10, 000 is a huge number in reality, we set the maxi-
mum number of queries to 2, 000 instead, and set ρ to 0.01.
4.2. On the Perturbation δ∗ and Dimension m
Before evaluating the effectiveness of our proposed
method, we first verify that the perturbation δ∗ exists un-
der the sensing matrix setting, and determine the value of
dimension m experimentally. In this experiment, we utilize
another 100 images randomly sampled from ImageNet for
validation.
4.2.1 On the Existence of Perturbation δ∗
To verify that the existence of adversarial perturbation δ∗
in the low-frequency space constrained by our sensing ma-
trix, we first perform the white-box attack using the BIM
method [23] with/without the sensing matrix A. The re-
sults are shown in Tab. 1. All attacks achieve a 100% suc-
cess rate, which demonstrates that there indeed exist opti-
mal perturbation with the sensing matrix constrained. In-
terestingly, we discover that perturbations found with the
low-frequency constraint tend to have a much smaller aver-
age l2-norm, which is consistent with the results in [17].
5https://github.com/MadryLab/blackbox-bandits,
https://github.com/cg563/simple-blackbox-attack
Success Rate Average L2-Norm
R V I R V I
BIM 100% 100% 100% 4.03 3.90 5.00
BIM+Sensing Matrix A 100% 100% 100% 2.06 1.70 1.86
Table 1. Results for BIM attack and BIM with our sensing matrix
A under the white-box setting. R, V, and I denote ResNet50, VGG-
16, and Inception V3, respectively. The 100% success rate verifies
the existence of the adversarial perturbation.
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Figure 1. The effect of the dimensionality.
4.2.2 On the Choice of Dimensionm
For determining the dimension of the measurement vectors,
the JohnsonLindenstrauss lemma [22] suggests that for a
group of n points in Rd, there exists a linear map g : Rd →
Rm, m > 8 ln(n)/2 that keeps the distance between these
points:
(1− )‖u− v‖2 ≤ ‖g(u)− g(v)‖2 ≤ (1 + )‖u− v‖2, (12)
where u and v are two points, and  ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter
controlling the quality of the projection. However, since it
is hard to count the number of points in the low-frequency
space, we leave the theoretical discovery of the value of m
in our future work. Instead, we choose it experimentally
in this paper. As depicted in Fig. 1, we evaluate the suc-
cess rate and average queries by setting different values of
m for ResNet50 and VGG-16. Intuitively, a moderate value
is needed since a small dimension degenerates the repre-
sentation ability and a large dimension enlarges the search
space. Consistent with our intuition, the algorithm is hard
to find a satisfying solution with a small dimension, which
results in a poor success rate and more queries. With a large
dimension and a large solution space, the algorithm needs
more steps to find the optimal solution. As a result, we set
m to 1, 500, 2, 000 and 4, 000 for ResNet50, VGG-16 and
Inception V3, respectively.
4.3. On the Effect of the Sensing Matrix
As aforementioned, the sensing matrix we design can be
integrated into existing methods. We evaluate the perfor-
mance after plugging it into NES and BanditsT . Note that
the data-dependent prior [21] used in BanditsTD is also a
kind of dimensionality reduction (as reduced from the orig-
inal image space to a low-resolution space with the dimen-
sion of 50×50×3 = 7, 500), we compare the performance
of our sensing matrix with it. Another projection matrix,
Methods ResNet50 VGG-16 Inception V3ASR Queries ASR Queries ASR Queries
NES 52.0% 1078/1521 60.7% 1013/1402 26.1% 1146/1777
NES+Gaussian 50.7% 1035/1511 59.0% 999/1410 25.1% 1112/1776
NES+Ours 79.2% 896/1125 78.3% 873/1117 48.7% 958/1493
BanditsT 54.1% 719/1306 62.9% 679/1169 34.0% 866/1615
BanditsTD 74.7% 621/970 78.6% 565/871 55.9% 701/1274
BanditsT+Ours 78.3% 552/867 79.5% 474/787 56.8% 668/1243
Table 2. Results of the sensing matrix. Gaussian means the random
Gaussian matrix. ASR represents the attack success rate (higher is
better). Queries denote the average queries, under which the left
number is the amount on success samples and the right number is
the amount on all samples (lower is better).
i.e., random Gaussian matrix, is also evaluated. The quanti-
tative results conducted on 1, 000 randomly selected images
can be found in Tab. 2. The results of the random Gaus-
sian matrix show no positive influence on the performance
with lower success rates and similar numbers of queries.
On the contrary, the sensing matrix designed with the low-
frequency constraint can at most improve the success rate
by 27.2%, and reduce nearly 26% queries. Taking BanditsT
as baseline, the data-dependent prior from BanditsTD is
an effective method that can reduce 25% queries approx-
imately with a 20.6% success rate improved. However,
our sensing matrix is more effective that can reduce 34%
queries with a 24.2% success rate improved. To explain, the
solution space our sensing matrix maps to is much smaller
than the one from the data-dependent prior, and the optimal
perturbation exists in this space. Finally, it is worth not-
ing that the low-frequency sensing matrix is plug-and-play,
which can improve the performance of other methods effi-
ciently.
4.4. The Results of PPBA on ImageNet
We evaluate the performance of our proposed PPBA in
Tab. 3 with the maximum l2-norm of perturbation set to 5
as in [21]. Compared with NES and BanditsTD, PRBA
and PPBA both achieve a higher success rate with fewer
queries. For example, PRBA improves 12.3% success rate
and reduces 24% queries compared with BanditsTD for
ResNet50, and PPBA achieves even better results. Com-
pared with SimBA-DCT, PRBA and PPBA obtain competi-
tive results except for the success rate on ResNet50. The av-
erage queries of PPBA are at most 24% fewer than SimBA-
DCT, which makes PPBA standout. The PPBA method is
better than PRBA with a 1.9% higher success rate and 15%
fewer queries taking ResNet50 for example, which demon-
strates the efficiency of the probability-driven strategy. To
further investigate the relationship between the success rate
and the number of queries, we plot the curves of success
rate versus queries in Fig. 2. From these curves, we con-
clude that for more samples, PPBA finds feasible solutions
within 2, 000 queries more quickly. The AUC has been cal-
culated for a quantitative comparison in Tab. 3, which also
indicates the superiority of our method.
Methods ResNet50 VGG-16 Inception V3ASR Queries AUC ASR Queries AUC ASR Queries AUC
NES 52.0% 1078/1521 481.5 60.7% 1013/1402 601.3 26.1% 1146/1777 224.3
BanditsT 54.1% 719/1306 694.2 62.9% 679/1169 831.5 34.0% 866/1615 385.7
BanditsTD 74.7% 621/970 1030.4 78.6% 565/871 1129.3 55.9% 701/1274 726.6
SimBA-DCT 87.0% 604/779 1214.3 88.5% 563/722 1271.5 61.2% 672/1181 812.6
PRBA 82.9% 540/790 1210.6 88.5% 489/663 1337.2 62.1% 580/1118 882.3
PPBA 84.8% 430/668 1331.3 90.3% 392/548 1451.5 65.3% 546/1051 948.9
Table 3. Results of l2 attack for different methods.
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Figure 2. Curves of the attack success rate versus the number of queries for l2 attack.
Methods ResNet50 VGG-16 Inception V3ASR Queries AUC ASR Queries AUC ASR Queries AUC
NES 68.7% 867/1222 812.7 77.7% 745/1026 1013.2 51.2% 848/1411 606.7
BanditsTD 84.9% 409/648 1352.7 87.7% 238/454 1526.6 59.9% 592/1162 836.9
SimBA-DCT 88.4% 646/797 1197.8 91.9% 556/667 1327.7 64.2% 747/1190 804.5
PPBA 96.6% 427/481 1519.6 98.2% 337/367 1633.1 67.9% 566/1026 974.2
Table 4. Results of l∞ attack for different methods.
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Figure 3. Curves of the attack success rate versus the number of
queries for l∞ attack.
We evaluate the effectiveness of PPBA under the l∞-
norm as well. Following the setting in [21], the maximum
l∞-norm of perturbations is set to 0.05. The quantitative
results are shown in Tab. 4, and the curves of the attack suc-
cess rate versus the number of queries are depicted in Fig. 3.
Similar to the results of l2 attack, PPBA shows advantages
over the baselines with at most 8.2% success rate improved
and 26% queries reduced. We can see that PPBA is more
effective and practical enough compared with the state-of-
the-art methods.
To further investigate why PPBA is effective, we mea-
sure how often the optimization steps found by the algo-
rithm can bring a descent on the objective function. Such
a step is defined as an effective one, by which the step-
effective rate is calculated. We select 50 images randomly
for validation, and plot the curves of the step-effective
rate versus the number of queries for PRBA and PPBA,
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
Queries
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
St
ep
-e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
Ra
te BanditsTDPRBA
PPBA
(a) ResNet50
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
Queries
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
St
ep
-e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
Ra
te BanditsTD
PRBA
PPBA
(b) VGG-16
Figure 4. Curves of the step-effective rate versus the number of
queries for PRBA, PPBA, and BanditsTD .
along with BanditsTD in Fig. 4. As depicted in the figure,
we find that PPBA achieves more than 20% step-effective
rate throughout the optimization process, while those of
BanditsTD are less than 20%. These results show that
the restriction on the optimization step and the probability-
driven strategy improve the sample efficiency, and help
PPBA find feasible solutions quickly.
4.5. On Attacking Google Cloud Vision
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our method against
real-world online systems, we conduct attacks against the
Google Cloud Vision API, which is an online service that
offers powerful classification models. Attacking this sys-
tem is significantly harder than attacking models pre-trained
on ImageNet, since the model is trained on more classes
and the exact classes are unclear, while only the top-k la-
bels with their corresponding probabilities for input images
can be obtained. We aim to attack the system by removing
Figure 5. Examples of attacking the Google Cloud Vision API.
The images on the left are the original ones and the images on the
right are perturbed by PPBA to remove the top-3 labels. Taking
the first row for example, the Google Cloud Vision API knows the
left one is a panda, but the right one is not a panda anymore.
the top-3 labels presented in the original returned list. As
in [18], we set the adversarial loss as the maximum of the
original top-3 labels’ returned probabilities, and minimize
the loss with our PPBA. Fig. 5 shows two attack examples.
The images on the left are the original ones and the images
on the right are perturbed by PPBA. Taking the first row for
example, the top-3 labels from the original returned list are
related to panda with more than 95% probabilities. After
perturbed by PPBA, the concepts related to panda disap-
pear from the list, and the Google Cloud Vision API gives
the labels related to the local content of the image.
Considering the cost the Google Cloud Vision API
charges, we evaluate our method on 50 randomly selected
images. We adopt a larger ρ = 0.1, and set the maximum
l∞-norm as 16/255 (16/255 is widely used in recent attack
competitions6). As a result, PPBA obtains an 84% success
rate with 314 average queries on success samples under this
setting, which demonstrates that PPBA is practical for real-
world systems. More visual results are given in Fig. 6.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we tackle the problem of the high query
budget that black-box attacks suffer. We propose a novel
projection & probability-driven attack, which mainly fo-
cuses on reducing the solution space and improving the op-
6https://www.kaggle.com/c/
nips-2017-non-targeted-adversarial-attack,
http://hof.geekpwn.org/caad/en/
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Figure 6. Visual examples for attacking the Google Cloud Vision
API. In each pair, the left is the original image, and the right is the
one perturbed by PPBA. The top-1 predictions with the probabili-
ties are listed under the images.
timization. Towards reducing the solution space, we pro-
pose to utilize a low-frequency constrained sensing matrix
to reduce the dimensionality of the solution space, inspired
by the compressed sensing theory and the low-frequency
hypothesis. Based on the sensing matrix, we further pro-
pose a probability-driven optimization that makes the best
use of all queries over the optimization process. We eval-
uate our proposed method on widely-used neural networks
pre-trained on ImageNet, i.e., ResNet50, VGG-16 and In-
ception V3, in which our method shows significantly higher
attack performance with fewer queries compared with the
state-of-the-art methods. Finally, we also attack the real-
world system, i.e., Google Cloud Vision API, with a success
rate as high as 84%, which further demonstrates the practi-
cality of our method. Last but not least, our work serves as
an inspiration in designing more robust models. We leave it
for our future work.
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